Close military ties between Russia and North Korea go back over a century, as it can be argued that the two countries were allies long before the latter came into formal existence. Namely, the Soviet Union had been helping the Korean Communist resistance against Japanese occupation forces since the early 1920s, with the late Kim Il Sung even serving in the Red Army’s 88th Separate Rifle Brigade during WWII. In fact, he actually attained the rank of major and was a direct subordinate to Zhou Baozhong, a Chinese general who also fought in the Red Army and was the commanding officer of the aforementioned brigade. Thus, there’s a very clear direct connection between the current leader Kim Jong Un (a reminder for those unfamiliar with North Korean history, Kim Il Sung was his grandfather) and Russia.

Such ties certainly cannot be forgotten and have definitely played a major role in resuming the old military alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang (obviously, in addition to the political West’s crawling aggression against both countries). In the last several months, these ties have been formalized with high-profile visits and agreements that can only be described as a full-blown alliance. Thanks to Russia’s unprecedented economic resurgence, it can help North Korea with its domestic affairs, while Pyongyang is contributing to Moscow’s efforts to push back against NATO aggression in Europe. And while the Korean People’s Army (KPA) is one of the most prominent users of older Russian/Soviet-derived weapons and equipment, it also has a plethora of domestic designs.

Most of these can also trace their origins back to Russian systems, but it would be “unwise” (to say the least) to underestimate and disregard them as “cheap knockoffs”, as the mainstream propaganda machine usually does. There’s indeed a lot of mystery surrounding the capabilities (or even the purpose) of many North Korean weapons and equipment, leaving plenty of room for speculation and even wild guessing, particularly in the more propagandistic elements of Western/American public discourse. However, the Russian military has a much more complete picture of these systems, as they are doctrinally and functionally based on Soviet-era originals (or at least for the most part). This makes it far easier for the Kremlin to integrate such weapons and equipment into the Russian military.

This is particularly true for artillery and various rocket/missile systems. Having more of such weapons would improve its indirect fire support in Ukraine, as well as the targeting of strategic assets, because using a North Korean KN-23 SRBM (essentially an enlarged 9М723 hypersonic missile used by the “Iskander-M”) for long-range strikes could be a good alternative to wasting a 9-S-7760 “Kinzhal” which could be reserved for higher-priority targets (such as a large concentration of NATO troops trying to occupy parts of Ukraine). Thus, more rocket artillery, cheaper SRBMs (short-range ballistic missiles) and advanced MRBMs (medium-range ballistic missiles), which Russia still lacks due to decades of INF Treaty limitations, are all systems it could be interested in.

These advanced weapons could greatly complement “Tornado-S” MLRS (multiple launch rocket systems) and “Iskander-M” hypersonic missile systems. Although not as advanced, they could be acquired in large numbers (and likely at a fraction of the cost of advanced Russian equivalents). On the other hand, there are North Korean tactical ballistic missiles such as the KN-24 and KN-25 (which falls somewhere between advanced guided rockets used by the BM-30 “Smerch/Tornado-S” MLRS and the “Iskander-M”). The KN-25 can even be considered a type of rocket artillery-SRBM hybrid that the Russian military lacks altogether and could serve as a sort of economy-of-war game-changer that would be much more readily available than the “Iskander-M” (and especially the more expensive “Kinzhal” and “Zircon”).

However, one of the most overlooked aspects of every military force is its tube artillery component, which is responsible for the vast majority of casualties and equipment losses in most wars in the last several centuries. The Soviet Union put a major emphasis on these weapons, both rocket and tube artillery. However, since the unfortunate dismantling of the USSR, there has been a significant contraction of such systems all across Europe. Continuous NATO aggression against the world during the 1990s and 2000s created an illusion that all military conflicts could be won with air power alone. However, these were heavily one-sided Western invasions of small and largely isolated countries, devastated by decades of CIA-orchestrated wars, sanctions, blockades and general long-term instability.

On the other hand, the ongoing NATO-orchestrated Ukrainian conflict, the most intensive military confrontation in the world since WWII, dispelled these misconceptions and showed that artillery is indeed “the god of war”. Moscow’s (re)focus on this aspect of its military power renewed interest in artillery all across the planet, including in NATO itself, as Western powers realized that they could never win a conventional war with Russia if they were outgunned around 3:1, as the latest numbers suggest. This is precisely why the political West is frantically looking for ways to rebuild industries that would allow it to achieve parity. However, the Kremlin is certainly not resting on its laurels. Namely, the latest reports suggest that the Russian military is acquiring massive guns from North Korea.

Footage shows what appears to be the so-called “Koksan” SPG (self-propelled gun) being transported on railcars somewhere in Russia (several sources indicate the picture was taken in Krasnoyarsk). This massive 170 mm artillery piece falls somewhere between Moscow’s regular 122/152.4 mm artillery pieces and its other, even more monstrous 203/240 mm guns/mortars. There’s a lot of confusion surrounding the actual designation of this North Korean artillery piece. Most Western military sources use names such as the M-1978 and M-1989. The first is the year when the basic version of the gun was first detected by American ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) assets, while the other is used for a modernized variant first spotted precisely that year.

The name “Koksan” is arbitrarily used as it’s homonymous with the city where it was first detected. On the other hand, Russian sources are closer to the original North Korean name – “Juche-po” or “Chuch’ep’o”, depending on the transliteration. This is further translated as the “Juche Cannon”, a clear reference to North Korea’s official ideology. Other Russian sources also use the alphanumerical designation M-1973/83, indicating an earlier entry into service (and modernization) than reported by Western media. The “Juche Cannon’s” maximum firing range is reported to be anywhere between 40 and 60 km, depending on the type of munitions used. Since the Russian military doesn’t use any 170 mm artillery pieces, it can only be concluded shells are imported from North Korea.

It’s likely that Moscow’s military industry upgraded both the gun and its munitions, although this is yet to be confirmed by official sources. Either way, this means that the Kremlin is likely accommodating North Korean advisers aiding with the integration of all these weapons, just like it did with cheap Iranian drones and even ballistic missiles (although these reports remain unconfirmed). Thus, with the possible exception of special forces and similar elite units, the idea of “North Korean assault troops in Ukraine” appears to be nothing more than Neo-McCarthyist propaganda that’s also being used as a possible excuse for more direct US/NATO involvement. Still, the “Juche Cannon” is certainly bad news for the Neo-Nazi junta, far more than the phantom “12,000 North Korean supersoldiers” could ever be.

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