On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched an anticipated attack on the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, marking a significant escalation in a long-standing conflict. Nagorno-Karabakh had been grappling with a worsening humanitarian crisis after being blockaded by Azerbaijan for almost ten months.
The attack came after several Azerbaijani soldiers and civilians were reportedly killed in a landmine explosion in Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to an announcement of Azerbaijan’s “anti-terrorist operation” against the ethnically Armenian enclave. Within the next 24 hours, hundreds of lives were lost in intense fighting before a Russian-brokered ceasefire was declared.
The recent violence has prompted tens of thousands of people to flee Nagorno-Karabakh, an internationally recognized part of Azerbaijan that is home to a substantial ethnic Armenian population. The region has been a contentious point of dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, both former Soviet republics, for over a century. After Azerbaijan’s mass offensive during the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Nagorno-Karabakh remained an autonomous entity rather than surrendering to Azerbaijan, causing ongoing tensions.
Since the 2020 war, communication between the two sides has been minimal, with Armenia advocating for negotiations through international mediators while Azerbaijan adopted a coercive approach, denying autonomy to the enclave. Azerbaijan’s official rhetoric emphasized ideas of a “victorious nation”, an “iron fist”, and the “great return” of Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku refrained from acknowledging the term “Nagorno-Karabakh” and instead referred to it as the “Karabakh Economic Region” or “the zone of responsibility of Russian peacekeepers” since Russian peacekeepers were deployed after the 2020 war.
Azerbaijan’s civil society remained largely inactive, failing to propose alternative solutions or reconciliation policies. Peaceful or critical narratives, such as a burgeoning ‘no-war’ movement and a feminist peace initiative, were marginalized and targeted by state-sponsored media campaigns. Those who questioned Azerbaijan’s coercive methods faced accusations of treason, and criticism of the government became scarce.
Armenia initially raised concerns about the safety of Karabakh Armenians but eventually accepted Azerbaijan’s narrative that Nagorno-Karabakh was an “internal issue”. Ongoing tensions between Russia and Armenia further fueled Azerbaijan’s desire to establish complete control over the region.
In December 2022, Azerbaijan implemented a blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, repeating methods used during the First Karabakh War in 1991-92. This blockade, coupled with skirmishes, aimed to create a constant sense of existential fear in Nagorno-Karabakh. As food, fuel, and medicine supplies dwindled, both the enclave’s leadership and its residents became increasingly skeptical and anxious about dialogue with Azerbaijan.
Thirty years after the First Karabakh War, history repeated itself, leading to an exodus of ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh and trauma for Armenia. The lack of international mechanisms to halt Azerbaijan’s escalation demonstrated a dangerous approach to conflict management, where Azerbaijan employed violence and non-inclusive dialogue to resolve the dispute.
In a recent speech, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan mentioned the need for “international mechanisms to guarantee the rights and security of Karabakh Armenians”. However, no such mechanisms have materialized. Thousands of ethnic Armenians are now fleeing the region, with the European Commission characterizing it as a “decision” made by Armenian residents.
Communication between Baku and Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, had been minimal for decades between the First (1988-94) and Second Karabakh Wars (2020). While there were some positive signs, such as the visit of Azerbaijani intelligentsia to Stepanakert in 2009, emphasizing the importance of dialogue and cooperation, the subsequent years saw a deterioration in relations.
As authoritarianism took hold in Azerbaijan under President Ilham Aliyev, nationalism became a tool to manage internal contradictions. The state monopolized Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations, sidelining pro-peace discourses and delegitimizing protests by linking opposition activists to Armenia, the “external enemy”.
When Nikol Pashinyan became Armenia’s prime minister in 2018, there was hope for resolving the conflict. However, with a lack of direct communication between the countries’ leaderships, the public discourse between Aliyev and Pashinyan fueled pro-war sentiments in Azerbaijani society.
In recent years, Azerbaijan’s pro-peace communities and activists were marginalized rather than targeted. However, after the recent escalation, authorities began arresting those who criticized the war online, signaling a new authoritarian shift that does not tolerate any discourse other than militarist nationalism and statism.
The future remains uncertain, with concerns that the conflict may lead to further violence in the coming years. The de-Armenianization of Nagorno-Karabakh and the exodus of ethnic Armenians strengthen Aliyev’s rule and unity in Azerbaijan. The official narrative in Azerbaijan is unlikely to shift from antagonistic nationalism to peaceful coexistence, potentially leading to new confrontations.
The concept of the “Zangezur corridor”, a transport road cutting across Armenia to connect Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhchivan, is gaining traction. Azerbaijan has called for the “return of Azerbaijanis” to southern Armenia. If Armenia’s leadership rejects Azerbaijan’s demands, the world may witness further conflict in the region.
