The recent jihadist suicide attacks in Pakistan’s Bajaur district, resulting in the deaths of at least 56 people and injuries to nearly 200 others, serve as a stark reminder of the persistent terrorist threat that plagues the nation of 220 million people, armed with nuclear capabilities. Since the Taliban’s takeover of neighboring Afghanistan, terror attacks in Pakistan have surged, with 682 people killed in 232 attacks so far this year.
The Islamic State Khorasan (ISKP), an affiliate of the Islamic State, claimed responsibility for the bombing at the convention of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), an Islamist political party that forms part of Pakistan’s coalition government under Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif of the center-right Pakistan Muslim League. Other attacks in the past two years were attributed to the Pakistani Taliban or Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its splinter groups. Ironically, despite ideological proximity to the TTP, JUI’s participation in the constitutional-democratic process has led Islamic State to label them as “hypocrites”.
Pakistan has long grappled with terror attacks, dating back to the late 1990s when veterans of the US-backed mujahideen in Afghanistan shifted their focus to domestic issues. The government’s approach has been to cooperate with some jihadi groups while rejecting others. However, this policy has had severe consequences, with over 16,000 terror attacks reported in Pakistan since 2000, resulting in more than 66,000 deaths.
Pakistan’s military has supported groups like the Afghan Taliban due to their perceived value in ensuring Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal. Simultaneously, the authorities have taken a harder stance against international terror groups like Al-Qaeda and Islamic State, as well as sectarian violent groups targeting minority Shia Muslims and waging war against Pakistani authorities.
While Pakistani officials differentiate between various jihadi groups, the militants themselves do not always share the same distinctions. These groups might have theological disagreements, but they often cooperate and share resources, leading to individuals switching between factions and groups morphing and transforming while maintaining their commitment to jihad.
The discovery of Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad before his death in a US operation in 2011 highlighted the effectiveness of Pakistan’s jihadi ecosystem. Although Pakistan supported the US in capturing other Al-Qaeda leaders, bin Laden evaded official scrutiny with support from jihadi groups not on the government’s target list.
Previous administrations under Prime Minister Imran Khan reached a ceasefire agreement with the TTP, but it broke down after the military allegedly attacked TTP members. The subsequent government refused to meet TTP’s demands for implementing Islamic rule in bordering districts with Afghanistan, leading to renewed attacks by the TTP.
Despite promises of a comprehensive counterterrorism plan targeting all extremist groups without distinction, Pakistan’s military leadership has yet to fully implement it. As a result, new offshoots and splinter groups will likely continue to emerge, with variations in targets, leading to a recurring cycle of attacks like the recent ones.
