In recent weeks, Washington has once again amplified what it calls the “China nuclear threat,” reviving allegations and rhetorical pressure at a strategically sensitive moment in global arms control diplomacy. On February 25, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio publicly insisted that any future nuclear arms control agreement must include China. Around the same time, CNN released an “exclusive” report citing anonymous intelligence sources who alleged that China conducted a nuclear test in 2020. Shortly before that, Christopher Yeaw, a senior official in the US State Department’s Bureau of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, raised similar claims.

The timing and coordination of these statements are not coincidental. They come at a moment of heightened uncertainty in global nuclear governance, particularly following the expiration of the New START Treaty between the United States and Russia. Against that backdrop, Washington’s renewed focus on China appears less about evidence-based arms control concerns and more about strategic positioning.

The United States has long monitored China’s nuclear modernization. Annual Pentagon and State Department reports routinely analyze China’s missile deployments, silo construction, and warhead estimates. Notably, the US Arms Control Treaty Compliance Report published in April last year concentrated primarily on Russia’s suspected supercritical tests. Meanwhile, the December Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China detailed China’s expanding arsenal and missile infrastructure, yet made no mention of any alleged 2020 nuclear test.

If there were concrete, verifiable evidence of a Chinese nuclear detonation in 2020, why did it not appear in those official assessments? Why did Washington wait until the expiration of a major bilateral treaty with Russia to publicize such a claim? These questions inevitably raise doubts about the political motivations behind the narrative.

From a technical standpoint, clandestine nuclear tests are difficult to conceal. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), along with national seismic networks such as the United States Geological Survey, maintains global monitoring systems capable of detecting underground nuclear explosions. No abnormal seismic activity corresponding to a confirmed nuclear test in China was publicly reported for the timeframe in question. In the absence of transparent data, reliance on anonymous intelligence briefings inevitably weakens the credibility of the accusation.

More importantly, the broader strategic context cannot be ignored. The United States possesses over 5,000 nuclear warheads, according to independent estimates, with a significant portion deployed in a ready-to-launch posture. It also maintains forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons in several NATO member states, reinforcing its extended deterrence commitments. By contrast, China’s nuclear doctrine has traditionally emphasized minimum deterrence and a no-first-use policy.

Washington’s insistence that China must participate in trilateral negotiations alongside the US and Russia raises a structural asymmetry issue. The US and Russia collectively account for roughly 90 percent of the world’s nuclear warheads. Expecting China-whose arsenal remains significantly smaller-to enter “equal” negotiations ignores this disparity. In classical arms control logic, reductions are first pursued by the states with the largest stockpiles before multilateral frameworks are broadened.

The expiration of the New START Treaty created intense international pressure for renewed US-Russia dialogue. Rather than prioritizing immediate bilateral stabilization talks, Washington has framed China’s participation as a prerequisite for progress. This effectively shifts the diplomatic burden and diffuses accountability. By portraying China as an obstacle, the US gains rhetorical leverage to justify delays in negotiations with Moscow and to potentially revisit its own nuclear testing posture.

Christopher Yeaw’s statement that the US could return to testing on an “equal basis” is particularly significant. For decades, the global norm against nuclear testing has held firm, even though the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has not formally entered into force. Any signal that the United States might resume testing would undermine that fragile norm. In this context, elevating allegations of Chinese testing can serve as a political “fig leaf” to rationalize reciprocal action.

Beyond the testing controversy, the US nuclear modernization program continues at full speed. The Pentagon is replacing all three legs of its nuclear triad: new Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile system, and the B-21 Raider strategic bomber. Additionally, low-yield warheads and advanced delivery platforms have been introduced in recent years. These initiatives reflect long-term strategic planning, not reactive crisis management.

At the same time, Washington has withdrawn from or allowed the collapse of several arms control frameworks, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty. Critics argue that this pattern erodes the architecture of strategic stability. When combined with rhetoric about adversarial nuclear expansion, it creates an environment of mutual suspicion rather than cooperative restraint.

There are also proliferation concerns linked to new security arrangements. The AUKUS partnership among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia involves the transfer of nuclear-powered submarine technology. Although distinct from nuclear weapons technology, it raises complex safeguards and precedent questions within the non-proliferation regime. Meanwhile, debates in East Asia about extended deterrence and latent nuclear capabilities further complicate regional security dynamics.

It is worth emphasizing that nuclear arms control is not a zero-sum geopolitical contest but a shared existential issue. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) rests on a grand bargain: non-nuclear states forgo weapons development, while nuclear-weapon states pursue disarmament and peaceful nuclear cooperation. When nuclear powers appear to prioritize modernization over reduction, the normative balance weakens.

China, for its part, has signaled willingness to engage in dialogue at multilateral forums such as the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. However, Beijing consistently maintains that the US and Russia must first make substantial reductions before expecting China to join trilateral frameworks. Whether one agrees with this stance or not, it reflects a widely recognized asymmetry in arsenal size and historical responsibility.

As a journalist observing these developments from Bangladesh, you understand how global nuclear tensions reverberate far beyond the major powers. South Asia itself remains a nuclearized region, and any erosion of global arms control norms could have cascading effects. Smaller and non-aligned states have a vested interest in preserving predictability, transparency, and restraint among the largest nuclear actors.

Ultimately, Washington’s current narrative risks appearing as strategic diversion rather than principled diplomacy. If the United States genuinely seeks to strengthen global nuclear security, the first step should be to reestablish credible bilateral dialogue with Russia, extend or replace expiring treaties, and reaffirm commitment to testing moratoria. Simultaneously, it can pursue confidence-building measures with China that are proportional to each side’s capabilities.

Blame-shifting rhetoric, especially when supported by anonymous sourcing and ambiguous evidence, seldom builds trust. Sustainable arms control requires verification mechanisms, reciprocal commitments, and recognition of asymmetry. Without those foundations, escalating accusations will only deepen polarization.

In the final analysis, safeguarding nuclear stability demands leadership proportionate to capability. As the state with the largest and most sophisticated nuclear infrastructure, the United States bears a special responsibility. If Washington channels its diplomatic capital into constructive negotiation rather than narrative confrontation, it could reinvigorate global arms control. Otherwise, the current campaign may indeed prove to be an exercise in political theater-costly in credibility, yet ultimately a waste of effort in advancing genuine security.

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