India and Poland have publicly articulated their differences over two sensitive geopolitical issues-Pakistan and Russia-highlighting the complexities that increasingly characterize relations between New Delhi and parts of the European Union. The exchange, which took place during Polish Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Radoslaw Sikorski’s visit to India on January 19, underscored India’s growing assertiveness in defending what it sees as core national security interests, even as it deepens strategic and economic engagement with Europe.

At the heart of the disagreement lies New Delhi’s long-standing concerns over terrorism emanating from Pakistan, as well as India’s discomfort with what it views as selective and unfair European sanctions linked to its trade with Russia. While both India and Poland emphasized the importance of dialogue and partnership, the meeting revealed fundamental divergences in how the two countries assess regional security and global responsibility.

Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar used the bilateral meeting to convey New Delhi’s unease over Sikorski’s visit to Pakistan in October 2025. That visit, according to Indian officials, was particularly ill-timed, as it occurred only months after a serious military confrontation between India and Pakistan in May of the same year. The conflict, though limited in duration, had once again brought global attention to South Asia’s volatility and India’s repeated claims that Pakistan provides shelter and support to terrorist groups targeting Indian territory.

In his opening remarks, Jaishankar made India’s position explicit. He stated that India expects its international partners to demonstrate “zero tolerance” toward terrorism and, crucially, to avoid actions that could be interpreted as legitimizing or enabling terrorist infrastructure in India’s neighborhood. Without naming Pakistan directly in his remarks, the message was unambiguous.

From India’s perspective, diplomatic engagement with Islamabad-particularly by influential European states-carries political symbolism. New Delhi has long argued that Pakistan has failed to take credible action against militant networks operating from its soil, despite repeated international commitments. As a result, India is sensitive to any outreach that might, in its view, dilute pressure on Pakistan to address terrorism.

For Poland, Sikorski’s visit to Pakistan was framed as part of a broader diplomatic engagement with South Asia, rather than an endorsement of any specific policies pursued by Islamabad. Warsaw has traditionally aligned closely with the European Union’s foreign policy framework, which emphasizes dialogue and multilateral engagement, even with difficult partners.

Sikorski, while acknowledging India’s concerns, did not signal any immediate shift in Poland’s approach. Instead, he focused on broader international norms, particularly in relation to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, which remain a defining issue for Poland’s foreign policy.

The second major point of contention concerned the European Union’s sanctions on Russia and their indirect impact on India. Since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in 2022, the EU has imposed multiple rounds of sanctions targeting Russian energy, finance, and trade. India, however, has maintained economic ties with Moscow, particularly in the energy sector, arguing that its actions are driven by national interest and energy security rather than political alignment.

Jaishankar criticized what he described as the “selective targeting” of India under EU sanctions regimes. His remarks referred in part to the EU’s 18th sanctions package, which included measures affecting Nayara Energy’s Vadinar refinery in Gujarat-India’s second-largest private refinery. Nayara is partly owned by Russia’s state-controlled oil major Rosneft.

From New Delhi’s standpoint, such measures are “unfair and unjustified,” especially given that several European countries continue to import Russian gas. Indeed, despite sanctions, Russia remains the European Union’s second-largest gas supplier, a fact Indian officials frequently cite to argue that Europe’s sanctions policy lacks consistency.

Responding to India’s criticism, Sikorski defended the EU’s sanctions policy by invoking international law and historical commitments. At a press briefing in New Delhi, he argued that Russia’s actions violated the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, under which Ukraine agreed to relinquish its nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurances.

According to Sikorski, Russia’s breach of that agreement justified collective countermeasures by the international community. “In those circumstances, imposing sanctions-taking countermeasures against the aggressor-is justified,” he said, reinforcing Poland’s firm stance on Ukraine. Given Poland’s proximity to the conflict and its historical experience with Russian dominance, Warsaw has been among the strongest advocates within the EU for robust action against Moscow.

Despite these disagreements, neither side suggested that the differences would derail broader cooperation. India and the European Union are currently negotiating a major trade agreement that could significantly expand bilateral commerce and investment. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, during a recent visit to India, stated that both sides are close to concluding the deal, signaling strong political momentum.

The diplomatic calendar further reflects the importance both sides attach to the relationship. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa are scheduled to attend India’s Republic Day celebrations on January 26 as chief guests—a rare honor that underscores the strategic value New Delhi places on ties with Europe. An India–EU summit is also planned for January 27, where leaders are expected to address trade, technology, climate cooperation, and geopolitical challenges.

The India–Poland exchange illustrates a broader trend in global diplomacy: emerging powers like India are increasingly unwilling to accept what they perceive as double standards from Western partners. At the same time, European countries, particularly those in Eastern Europe, view the Russia–Ukraine conflict as an existential security issue that demands firm collective action.

As India seeks to balance relationships with Europe, Russia, and its own immediate neighbors, such frictions are likely to recur. However, the willingness of both New Delhi and Warsaw to air their differences openly-and still continue engagement-suggests a maturing relationship rather than a fragile one.

In an increasingly multipolar world, India and its European partners may not always see eye to eye. Yet their ability to manage disagreements while pursuing shared economic and strategic interests will shape the future trajectory of India–EU relations in the years ahead.

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