The differences between the US and India regarding Bangladesh are causing rising tensions, particularly as the United States is threatening of taking punitive actions ahead of the forthcoming parliamentary elections, which is scheduled to take place on January 7, 2024. This move is escalating clashes between New Delhi and Washington over Bangladesh’s political scene. The US State Department’s firm stance on ensuring fair elections is a notable shift from the usual voting practices, tightening control over Bangladesh’s Awami League government to prevent a repeat of past electoral manipulations in 2014 and 2018. While India considers Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League a reliable ally, their statements suggest a clear goal: to maintain Hasina’s leadership. Despite being strategic partners, the US and India are at odds over Bangladesh’s electoral and democratic landscape, which became more apparent after the November 10, 2023, 2+2 dialogue in Delhi.
Initially, the Delhi-Washington strategic partnership aimed to serve US geostrategic interests against China, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. However, efforts to align India’s perspective on China and other global issues with the US have faced setbacks due to India’s historical ties with Russia, its non-aligned stance, and its reluctance to hinder groups like BRICS, frustrating Washington. Strains heightened during the recent G20 summit when India’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict clashed with US interests.
China’s increasing influence in the Indo-Pacific has prompted a significant US strategic focus on the Bay of Bengal, notably in Bangladesh. Meanwhile, South Asia grapples with the rise of radical Islamist rule in Afghanistan, instability in Pakistan, and the Biden administration’s attempts to support the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its ally, Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), to regain power in Bangladesh.
The US’s reservations about Sheikh Hasina’s government drive its agenda to replace her, aligning with a regime change approach. However, India staunchly supports Hasina’s Awami League, perceiving no better alternative. The US’s sympathy towards BNP-Jamaat, evident in their response to nationwide protests and strikes, contrasts sharply with their silence on the violence caused by these groups. This imbalance underscores the complexity of the geopolitical situation.
India prioritizes stability over disruptive elections, as highlighted in the recent 2+2 dialogue where Bangladesh was notably omitted from the joint statement, indicating a lack of consensus. India’s concern about potential unrest and radicalization in Bangladesh differs from the proactive US approach.
US pressure may push Bangladesh closer to China, unsettling India. If the BNP-Jamaat alliance assumes power, it could strengthen ties with Islamabad and pose a threat to India’s security, as seen during BNP’s previous tenure from 2001 to 2006. That period witnessed increased extremist activities and marginalized minority communities.
Bangladesh’s growing importance in South and Southeast Asia intensifies global powers’ competition. Any significant political change could disrupt regional stability, especially impacting India and Myanmar. Washington’s desire for Arakan’s independence and concerns about India’s territorial integrity complicate the geopolitical landscape.
Washington’s pressure and its inclination towards BNP-Jamaat aim to assert influence over India, which seeks regional power status. This complicates India’s balanced foreign policy and challenges US efforts to contain China.
Bangladesh becomes a pawn in this global rivalry. While the scheduled elections may proceed as planned and Awami League might retain power, post-election scenarios could be chaotic. Visa restrictions and sanctions might exacerbate the situation. Sheikh Hasina might have to rely on the constitutional process, leaving the eventual outcome uncertain and potentially tumultuous, affecting far-reaching consequences beyond Bangladesh’s borders.
