Ever since the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken hinted at the possibility of visa-related sanctions on Bangladesh’s politicians, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has been in an optimistic mood. The party and its political allies advocate for a transparent and fair election, which is a legitimate goal. It is understandable that the BNP, out of power since 2006, is eager to return to office.
However, more significant questions arise regarding the BNP’s ability to come to terms with the political realities that have shaped Bangladesh over the last 14 years. The party’s leaders have shown unwavering determination in their efforts to oust the current government, which suggests a desire for a fresh start if they regain power through the upcoming general election.
In recent times, the BNP has put forth various ideas to reform the state and has outlined its plans for governance. But amidst these proposals, there is a glaring absence of addressing the crisis the party created in the late 1970s concerning Bangladesh’s history. The BNP has not condemned the assassinations of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the four national leaders in 1975, nor has it explained the imposition of “Bangladeshi nationalism” in contrast to the core principle of Bengali nationalism that guided the country’s politics during the autonomy movement and the War for Liberation.
The concept of “Bangladeshi nationalism” contradicts the spirit of the national liberation movement, and the BNP’s failure to acknowledge this creates a conundrum in the country’s political landscape. On one side are progressive forces rooted in Bengali nationalism, while on the other, there is the right-wing ideology that goes against the founding principles of the state.
Furthermore, the BNP has yet to clarify its position on the infamous indemnity ordinance, which remained in the nation’s constitution during its founder’s tenure until it was repealed in 1996. The party has not distanced itself from this act or demonstrated a willingness to adapt to the transformative nature of national politics after its repeal.
Another critical issue is the distortion of history during the BNP’s time in power, which saw the airbrushing of Bangabandhu and the authentic story of the War for Liberation. Despite projecting readiness to implement its reform points, the party remains silent on its interpretation of history and its impact on the national narrative.
These challenges must be addressed by the BNP if it aims to participate effectively in election-oriented politics. Failure to do so could exacerbate the country’s divisiveness. Historically, national unity played a crucial role in Bangladesh’s politics during the 1960s, the 1971 war, and the early post-war period. However, politics post-August 1975 undermined these principles. It is essential for those defending the BNP’s politics to acknowledge the realities they have ignored or deliberately disregarded.
While the BNP seeks a clean and fair election, it must also provide reassurances on foreign policy continuity and distance itself from past incidents of violence. In the lead-up to the election, the party’s leading voices must send the right messages to the country and avoid questioning national history.
Furthermore, political parties, including the BNP, should refrain from involving foreign diplomatic missions in Bangladesh’s internal politics. Allowing foreign governments to publicly dictate how Bangladesh should conduct its politics is demeaning and undermines the nation’s sovereignty.
The BNP faces significant challenges in navigating Bangladesh’s political landscape and global politics. Addressing historical distortions, acknowledging the spirit of national liberation, and demonstrating maturity in politics are necessary steps for the party to move forward effectively. By doing so, the BNP can contribute to a more united and progressive Bangladesh.
