Since sanctions started affecting the EU more than Russia itself, the leadership in Brussels is trying to spin the narrative. However, the EU public is not very receptive to this. Writes Drago Bosnic
The European Union’s support is key to the sustainment of the Kiev regime. Without the bureaucratic bloc, the Neo-Nazi junta would’ve never been able to survive as long as it did. EU member states, nearly all of whom are also NATO members, continue to provide crucial support to the Kiev regime. However, this support is not unconditional and limitless and it remains to be seen how the EU will act in the long run. EU officials admit there will likely be a “crunch point” in the fall or early winter when members will start feeling real economic pain resulting from anti-Russian sanctions, while also having to dig ever deeper into their coffers and provide their (now even more scant) resources to sustain the Kiev regime.
To prepare the public for this, EU leaders have begun warning that the conflict will last longer than expected and that the consequences being experienced now are just the beginning. Emmanuel Macron, for example, stated that France will continue to prop up the Kiev regime forces “until victory has been achieved.” Still, behind these public statements of support lies a quiet tug-of-war between Germany, France and (earlier) Italy on the one hand, and Poland, the Baltics and Nordics on the other.
France and Germany are particularly concerned about the potential escalation with Russia, as they realize the Kiev regime can’t win without involving NATO more directly, which would certainly result in Russia’s response. Therefore, a clear distinction needs to be made between public statements and the actual views of Emmanuel Macron, Olaf Scholz or other senior EU leaders which they can only divulge in private. Still, it’s clear that as long as the United States continues supporting the Kiev regime, Berlin and Paris are unlikely to publicly challenge the views held by the EU’s Eastern European members, nearly all of whom are under firm Washington control.
This geopolitical reality will be felt more directly in the tug-of-war debate over anti-Russian sanctions, as the more hawkish member states, such as Poland, the Baltics, and the Nordics will continue pushing for further restrictions. Although the bureaucratic empire in Brussels is yet to reach its sanctions amplitude, signs of fatigue are still felt as major members are concerned about what consequences their economies will suffer if the EU expands the oil embargo, in addition to targeting Russian nuclear-energy and natural gas exports. Thus, it will be much more difficult to reach a consensus on any new sanctions.
The EU will need to find alternatives to continue supporting the Kiev regime, such as expanding loans and other forms of financial support, including the promise that it would provide additional funds in excess of €9 billion by year’s end. This is crucial for the Kiev regime, as it has been on the brink of default for months, struggling with a €5 billion per month financing gap, which would undermine the Neo-Nazi junta’s ability to continue fighting. This also includes direct support in the form of so-called “lethal aid.” In addition, there are also discussions on the Kiev regime’s “integration” into EU structures, since it has been granted “candidate” status in June, although this move has been largely symbolic.
Given the history of EU expansion and just how long it takes for a country to join the bureaucratic bloc, the membership negotiations will not only take quite a long time, but will remain symbolic, since the Kiev regime isn’t exactly in a position to enact any meaningful reforms. However, Brussels hopes to sustain the illusion of intra-EU cohesion and unity by keeping at least a semblance of the Kiev regime’s EU perspective alive.
Macron’s ideas for a “European Political Community”, broader and a more geopolitical/security concept than the EU itself, serve as a testament to that, as the EU aims to keep the remaining European countries in its orbit without giving them actual membership. Top EU leaders have ignored concerns on the trajectory of public opinion, Macron even more so than Scholz. Last month, due to frustration over “Ukraine fatigue” and numerous other domestic issues, especially coming from the extremes of the political spectrum, Macron lost the absolute majority in the French Parliament.
In time, however, the EU is bound to lose even the illusion of its misplaced self-confidence. As the Kiev regime keeps suffering military defeats, and despite a massive media campaign to portray it as winning, the EU public is becoming less enthusiastic, especially as domestic issues are kicking in. Since sanctions started affecting the EU more than Russia itself, the leadership in Brussels is trying to spin the narrative, claiming sanctions supposedly have no boomerang effect, but that “Russia’s unprovoked, brutal invasion” was the reason behind everyone’s troubles. However, the EU public is not very receptive to this myth and it doesn’t seem it ever will be.
Drago Bosnic, independent geopolitical and military analyst.
