In recent years, Turkey has made significant strides in normalizing its historically fraught relations with both Armenia and Syria. This diplomatic shift comes at a crucial moment, as regional dynamics have evolved dramatically, particularly in light of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The war has caused Russia, traditionally a dominant power in both the South Caucasus and the Middle East, to divert its attention and resources, creating an opportunity for Turkey to assert itself more decisively in these regions.

Turkey’s efforts to normalize ties with Armenia and Syria are not isolated diplomatic gestures but rather part of a broader recalibration of its foreign policy. With Armenia, Turkey aims to bolster its influence in the South Caucasus, while with Syria, the objective is to solidify its role in the Arab world and enhance its security by stabilizing its southern border. This article delves into how Turkey is leveraging this moment to reshape its relationships with Armenia and Syria, and how the decline in Russian influence has facilitated these moves.

Turkey’s relationship with Armenia has long been marked by tension, largely due to the historical legacy of the 1915 Armenian Genocide, which Turkey has refused to recognize. For decades, diplomatic relations between the two nations were non-existent, and their border has remained closed since 1993 due to Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

However, the need for regional stability and the geopolitical importance of the South Caucasus have pushed Turkey and Armenia toward rapprochement. The thaw began in 2021 when Turkish and Armenian leaders signaled their willingness to initiate talks. In September 2023, this process gained further momentum when Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met at the Turkish House in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Both leaders expressed a desire to “give new impetus” to their ongoing normalization efforts.

One of the key drivers of this shift is Armenia’s reassessment of its foreign policy in the wake of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, which resulted in a devastating loss for Armenia. Russia, traditionally viewed as Armenia’s security guarantor, largely stayed on the sidelines during the conflict, leading to widespread disillusionment in Yerevan. Armenia’s reliance on Russia has been further questioned following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, which has diverted Russia’s focus from the South Caucasus.

Faced with a diminished Russian presence, Armenia has increasingly sought to diversify its foreign policy by improving relations with Turkey and Western nations. This pivot is partly a reaction to growing domestic discontent over Armenia’s reliance on Russia, as well as the need to resolve its longstanding conflicts with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Although the Armenian diaspora and opposition groups have pressured Pashinyan to maintain a hardline stance, the country’s strategic vulnerability has forced the government to pursue normalization with Turkey.

For Turkey, normalizing relations with Armenia is a key part of its broader goal to expand its influence in the South Caucasus. The region is critical for Turkey’s strategic and economic interests, particularly in terms of energy transit routes. Improved relations with Armenia could pave the way for increased cooperation in infrastructure and trade, especially if the closed border between the two countries is reopened.

Turkey’s approach toward Armenia also reflects a desire to assert itself as a regional power broker, independent of Russian influence. Historically, Russia has viewed Armenia as part of its sphere of influence, but Moscow’s waning focus on the South Caucasus has given Turkey the opportunity to take the lead in diplomatic efforts. Notably, this is not the first time Russia has chosen to remain on the sidelines of Turkish-Armenian diplomacy. In 2009, when protocols for normalization were signed between the two countries, Russia opted not to intervene. The current situation is similar, with both Armenia and Turkey favoring a bilateral process free from external interference.

Turkey’s relations with Syria have been even more complex. Before the Syrian civil war, Ankara and Damascus enjoyed a brief period of cordial relations in the early 2000s. However, Turkey’s support for opposition forces during the civil war and its military incursions into northern Syria to combat Kurdish groups have strained ties with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

Despite these tensions, recent developments suggest that both Turkey and Syria are open to resuming dialogue. The impetus for this rapprochement comes in part from Russia’s shifting role in the region. Historically, Russia has acted as a stabilizing force in Syria, deploying troops and military hardware to support the Assad regime and prevent Turkish incursions. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has forced it to scale back its military presence in Syria, withdrawing troops and even removing its advanced S-300 air defense systems.

This reduction in Russian influence has opened the door for other regional actors, particularly Arab states, to step in as mediators between Turkey and Syria. Arab nations have a long history of facilitating dialogue between Ankara and Damascus, dating back to the 1990s. As Russia’s influence wanes, countries such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia are stepping in to fill the vacuum, offering Turkey an opportunity to engage with Syria on more favorable terms.

For Turkey, normalizing relations with Syria is not only about improving regional stability but also about addressing security concerns. The presence of Kurdish groups along the Turkish-Syrian border, which Turkey views as terrorists, has been a persistent source of tension. By improving relations with Damascus, Ankara hopes to create conditions for joint operations against Kurdish forces and secure its southern border.

The common thread linking Turkey’s normalization efforts with both Armenia and Syria is the decline of Russian influence. In both cases, Russia’s traditional role as a power broker has been diminished by its focus on the war in Ukraine. This has allowed Turkey to pursue its interests without the constraints imposed by Russian involvement.

In Armenia, Russia’s failure to intervene decisively in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and its subsequent preoccupation with Ukraine have weakened Moscow’s standing as a reliable ally. In Syria, Russia’s partial military withdrawal has shifted the balance of power, enabling Turkey to engage with Damascus more freely.

For Turkey, this moment represents a strategic opportunity to reshape its regional relationships. By taking the lead in normalization efforts with Armenia and Syria, Ankara is asserting itself as a key player in both the South Caucasus and the Middle East. This approach not only enhances Turkey’s regional influence but also allows it to pursue its interests without being constrained by external powers like Russia.

Turkey’s recent normalization efforts with Armenia and Syria mark a significant shift in its foreign policy, driven in large part by Russia’s waning influence in both regions. The war in Ukraine has diverted Moscow’s attention and resources, creating a window of opportunity for Turkey to assert itself more decisively. By improving relations with Armenia and Syria, Turkey is positioning itself as a key regional actor, capable of navigating complex geopolitical dynamics without relying on Russian support.

As Turkey continues to pursue its diplomatic goals, it remains to be seen how lasting these efforts will be. However, for now, Ankara has successfully seized the moment to reshape its regional relationships and enhance its influence in both the South Caucasus and the Middle East.

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