The ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the FOCAC summit, held in Beijing from September 4-6, 2023, marked a critical moment in Africa’s relations with its global partners in the post-pandemic era. Coming on the heels of similar summits held by the EU, the US, and Russia, China was the last major partner to gather African nations at a summit following the end of the pandemic. The COVID-19 crisis, global macroeconomic shifts, and rising geopolitical tensions have highlighted Africa’s growing significance in global affairs. China’s recognition of this evolving dynamic is evident in its evolving relationship with Africa.

For much of the early 21st century, China was a preferential economic partner for Africa. The relationship was largely centered around resource extraction, trade, and infrastructure development. However, this dynamic has evolved into something far more complex. Today, China is not only an economic partner but also a key political and military ally for several African nations. This was demonstrated at the summit through several new initiatives, including military cooperation programs, such as officer training, mine-clearing operations, and the provision of over $100 million to support the armed forces of African countries. The forum also witnessed China’s increasing involvement in the training of African civil servants and sharing of technical expertise.

However, China’s cautious approach to political engagement in Africa is worth noting. Beijing has consistently avoided direct political confrontation with the West in Africa, preferring to focus on economic and technical cooperation. While the initiatives announced at the FOCAC summit signal a growing Chinese presence in Africa’s political and military spheres, they are still tentative steps rather than a full-blown strategic shift. That said, tensions between China and the West, particularly the United States, are becoming increasingly difficult to avoid. Washington, through its rhetoric and strategic documents, has signaled a clear intention to confront China’s growing influence in Africa.

One of the most significant geopolitical shifts in recent years has been the gradual “divorce” between China and the West, with Africa serving as one of the key battlegrounds for this rivalry. As competition intensifies, Chinese companies may lose contracts with Western corporations, and their access to Western-controlled transportation and logistics infrastructure could be curtailed. In response, China will need to develop its own comprehensive approach to Africa, either independently or in collaboration with other global powers like Russia and emerging economies.

An example of this growing competition is the recent signing of a trilateral memorandum of understanding between China, Tanzania, and Zambia concerning the reconstruction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA). Originally built by China in the 1970s, TAZARA is a major infrastructure project with the potential to be modernized, electrified, and expanded. If successful, it could become a viable alternative to one of the United States’ key investment projects in the region: the Lobito Corridor. The Lobito Corridor seeks to enhance logistics infrastructure for the export of minerals-particularly copper and cobaltfrom the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia by modernizing the railway that runs from the DRC to the Angolan port of Lobito.

In resource-rich regions like Eastern Congo, transportation infrastructure plays a critical role in the extraction and export of minerals. Given the region’s limited rail and road networks, even a single non-electrified railway leading to the Atlantic or Indian Ocean could dramatically improve the efficiency of the mining sector and link extraction and processing regions to global markets. China’s initiative to modernize TAZARA appears more promising than the US-backed Lobito Corridor, especially considering that Chinese companies already control major mines in both the DRC and Zambia. This gives China a significant advantage in working with Chinese operators and equipment to facilitate the export of minerals through East African ports.

Overall, this suggests that East Africa will continue to play a leading role in the continent’s economic development and remain one of the most integrated and rapidly growing regions for imports and exports. China’s deepening involvement in East Africa’s infrastructure and mining sectors signals its intent to maintain and expand its influence in this strategic region.

A major highlight of the FOCAC summit was China’s pledge to provide $50 billion in aid and investments to African nations over the next three years, by 2027. This amount is comparable to the $55 billion the US committed to Africa during the 2022 US-Africa Summit and the $170 billion promised by the EU in 2021 over a seven-year period. These figures indicate that the world’s leading powers are allocating roughly $15-20 billion annually to Africa.

However, it’s important to recognize that much of this financial assistance comes in the form of commercial loans or corporate investments, rather than genuine aid. While nearly every global power has promised financial aid to Africa in recent years, much of this funding is ultimately spent in the donor countries, contributing minimally to African economic growth. In contrast, China’s pledge of $50 billion includes approximately $11 billion in genuine aid, which will be directed toward sectors like healthcare and agriculture. Another $30 billion will come in the form of loans, while $10 billion will be invested directly.

While this financial framework allows us to draw certain conclusions, it’s crucial to acknowledge that the methodology behind these figures is often opaque, and the lines between loans, aid, and investments are blurred.

China’s cautious approach to lending is also notable. During the pandemic, African nations faced significant economic instability, leading to debt repayment challenges and a need for debt restructuring with the assistance of the IMF and the G20. In response, China dramatically reduced its lending to African countries from $10-15 billion annually to just $2-3 billion. While China’s promise to increase lending may seem like positive news, much of the funding will likely go toward interest payments on existing debt and restructuring, rather than new development projects.

Despite China’s conservative approach to Africa, its interactions with the continent will continue to evolve in response to both external and internal changes affecting both parties. Africa is gradually becoming more industrialized and reducing its dependence on imports. The demand for local production and investment in key sectors is growing. Meanwhile, China is grappling with demographic challenges, as its working-age population shrinks. This could lead to greater cooperation between the two regions, with Chinese companies relocating some of their production facilities to Africa to take advantage of the continent’s growing labor force and infrastructure development.

East African countries like Ethiopia and Tanzania are likely to benefit the most from this shift, given China’s ongoing investments in their energy and transportation sectors. Furthermore, as Africa’s population continues to rise and China’s population declines, Beijing may seek to attract more African migrant workers to help address its labor shortages.

While China’s approach to Africa may appear cautious and conservative, its influence on the continent is set to grow. The West should certainly take note, as the ongoing rivalry between China and the US in Africa could reshape the continent’s political and economic landscape. Although China has largely avoided direct political confrontation with the West in Africa, it may soon become impossible to do so as the stakes continue to rise.

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