Transitional Sudan and the question of civil transformation


Perhaps the recent framework agreement in Sudan between the military council and major political parties marks  the entry of the state into a very important and sensitive transitional phase, while the dispute arose over the reference to the vision for the outcome of this agreement, and the size of the expectation of its future impact on the ground, in two positions, the first is considering it as it will lead to A civilian government that achieves the total withdrawal of the army from political action, as stipulated in that framework.

However, this text does not mean that it will turn into a comprehensive executive reality, so that the spirit and deep power of the army will withdraw from political life, which is the second position. The expected change, and doubts about the commitment of the military parties to their promises.

On the other hand, there was enough to assess the deep crisis of national civil consensus, whether at the level of the revolutionary groups themselves, or at the level of the active intellectual currents. The division was not limited to the struggle of the traditional Islamists, with the forces of the left and the modern liberal currents, between which something like an intellectual hybrid arose. , which is close to the social left and contemporary market liberalism, which are intellectual leaps that dominate today’s political and cultural life in the West, and leap onto the scene.

We are not in the light of explaining this intellectual hybrid, but we witness its transmission to the Arab world and Sudan as one of its models, through the emergence of rhetorical concepts and cultural features, which progress in the seasons of revolutions, and the most important thing that can be identified is the dumping in the manufacture of the human rights principle based on the vague feelings of the individual, not defined by a framework. Ethical and non-belief-religious existence, and transforming the rights of the self into a common mass of vague perceptions, in defining the individual and the family, and then building the intellectual system and its political struggle through this ideology.

On the other hand, the distinguishing case of the Islamic rise, which reviews the record of dynamic Islamic life, the extent of its involvement in the rescue experience, and its disastrous outcomes, has not progressed today to the Sudanese national arena, and there are files, concepts and intellectual reviews, Sudan is never unable to reach the ground of its liberation, and there are many personalities eligible for it.

Likewise, the active youth national forces that have emerged, believe in the Islamic reference outside the framework of the movement and ideological taboo, and possess a civilized and progressive intellectual spirit, appear today in the discourse of some young people, but they have not turned into an institution or an intellectual conference that brings together believers in the civil state, without a sense of inferiority or The break with the Islamic message, but rather the activation of its legal covenants and its crippled moral resurrection. Our view of these currents and ideas indicates a new cultural and intellectual presence that Sudan is experiencing, in light of huge international and regional polarizations, between political interference or intellectual promotion, especially since the youth are the ones who represented the force of the field struggle in confronting the regime of President Al-Bashir, yet their power did not turn into A decisive political coup, even if the revolution’s spectra participated in the new agreement.

But the outcome is that the waves that Sudan experienced, since the overthrow of al-Bashir and the conflict between two blocs of military forces, witnessed cases of fierce conflict between intellectual currents, in which the dialogue table was absent, and the platforms spasm, sending messages of retaliatory confrontation on the part of the new ideas, matched by stimulating anxiety, and turning back from Social-religious blocs, and during these stages that afflicted the revolution’s partners from outside the Islamists themselves, feelings of fear and anxiety rose over the impact of this chaos on the basics of the Sudanese national future, in light of the presence of armed movements within its regions, and functional roles offered to them from abroad.In addition to that, the global economic crisis and its impact on people’s livelihood and the stability of their living conditions, and therefore the question was in light of the multiplicity of parties between a major political security failure, and a transitional phase that allows the component and civil life to recover some of its demands and impose its presence, in popular participation, legislative oversight, and guaranteeing rights Constitutional rights for all, which is exactly what people should have agreed upon, in the collective national demands, without preventing that from guaranteeing the pluralistic right, and not affecting the legitimate rights of the individual in the state and in society.

It is certain that the Military Council benefited from the fears of the political vacuum, but the political intellectual impasse was also growing, and therefore this stage is an opportunity for civil society in Sudan, and when we say civil society, it means all partners in civil and constitutional life, including secularists, Islamists, technocrats and public opinion, to activate inclusive dialogue. Who leads society, to a greater human rights force that consolidates its popular participation, for the sake of a human rights homeland for all.

By Muhanna Al-Habil, Al-Watan


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